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Local institutional arrangements are now well-known as an important determinant of entrepreneurial 
performance (Nguyen et al., 2018). While the “rules of the game” or formal institutions are concerning 
general laws, regulations, and constitutions, local governance or the “play of the game” is the executions 
of these rules at local level (Williamson, 2000). When formal institutions, the “rules”, are underdeveloped 
and incomplete, local authorities have more room to “play the game” off-road, i.e., deviate from the merits 
of the rules (Aidis and Adachi, 2007). The mismatch between the rules and the play of the institutional 
game may negatively affect private firm growth performance. However, the extant literature lacks 
investigation on the mechanisms that link local institutional arrangements and firm development (Du and 
Mickiewicz, 2016). 
This study is designed to investigate one potential channel underlying the association between local 
institutional environments and firm growth performance. Specifically, we focus on explaining the firm 
investment decision. Investment is an important input leading to growth (Nickell, 1978). The decision of 
making an investment is, however, highly dependent on transaction costs and property right protections 
which are strongly shaped by local institutional environments (Guariglia, 2008). 
Institutions are multi-dimensional, some are more embedded in local norms and traditions while others are 
more responsive to adjustments (Fritsch and Mueller, 2007). The levels of legitimacy of institutional forces 
give rise to a situation in which an institutional improvement may, interestingly, lead to a drop in investment. 
This paradox occurs when local norms are sticky, so that local institutional players have a strong incentive 
to refuse any deviations from the norms. Corruption is a typical norm like that. Corruption is the situation 
in which officials abuse or misuse their powers to make private gains at the cost of social damage (Tonoyan 
et al., 2010). When the financial benefits obtained from bribery transactions are institutionalised (i.e., taken 
for granted), controls over freedom from corruption will make officials feel uncomfortable. With this 
legitimised set of logics and beliefs, officials may reduce their work efficiency to match with the new, lower 
level of incomes (without bribery). This behavioural adjustment consequently deteriorates public service 
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quality and extinguishes investment incentive. However, in the long-run, when the new set of rules and 
logics (corruption controls) are gradually institutionalised, corrupt officials, under the pressure of the new 
standards in their professions, must recover service quality for the sake of their survival, leading to more 
investment. 
Besides corruption, we also analyse the effect of administration transparency on investment. Non-
transparency is a situation in which information and resources are distributed unevenly among players who 
are not dissimilar (Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). This mismatch occurs when local officials play the 
institutional game to conform with local norms of doing business, which could be that a small group of 
players are always prioritised to access information before others, depending on their “back-door” 
relationship or political affiliation status (Zhou, 2013). Since the motivation to play obscurely may not be 
driven by financial factors, norms associated with public service transparency may be less persistent to 
changes than those associated with corruption, which is directly concerned with the financial incomes of 
officials. As the forces against transparency may be relatively less sticky in comparison to the forces against 
corruption controls, pushing public service transparency may not suffer from the initial severe negative 
inertia. 
On top of the institutional forces, we introduce local leadership proactivity as an institution-embedded 
governance force, which may be able to moderate local sticky (negative) norms. This force is different from 
corruption and transparency in the sense that it is largely under the control of local authorities, less affected 
by local norms, and easy to amend (Malesky, 2015). Governors may decide to be proactive because they 
want to legitimise themselves to the trending values of the economic transition, or because they truly 
recognise the necessity of improving the local business environment. Nevertheless, we suggest that 
leadership proactivity may be more efficient in regions with more corruption and less transparency. The 
core reason is, that the marginal effect of leadership proactivity is stronger when institutional liabilities 
remarkably constrain entrepreneurs from seeking efficiency. Meanwhile, in regions whose local norms of 
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doing business are more favourable (less corruption and more transparency), the effect of leadership 
proactivity appears less significant. 
We use a representative multi-level dataset including 945,724 firm observations in 63 provinces from 2006 
to 2015 in Vietnam, to examine the nature of local institutional arrangements, and their influence on the 
firm investment decision. This investigation makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, we 
show that the “play of the game” is able to explain the wide variations of entrepreneurial investment, within 
a homogenous and relatively stable national institutional setting. This finding helps uncover a “black box” 
in literature, which tries to link institutions to firm growth, but has not provided an explanatory mechanism 
(Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). 
More importantly, we show that the association between local institutions and investment depends primarily 
on the persistence of local norms and traditions. When local institutional players are strongly resistant to 
change, the relationship is U-shaped (e.g., corruption); but it is a simple linear positive relationship if the 
norms are prompt to adjustments (e.g., transparency). In addition, we find that forces which are relatively 
less sticky and more responsive to change, such as leadership proactivity could, to some extent, moderate 
the negative effects of sticky norms and give rise to more investment. 
Drawing from the key findings, this study provides three essential implications for policymakers. First, to 
boost investment incentives, local authorities need to work on local institutional arrangements. Investment, 
which is the groundwork of sustainable development, is intensely responsive to local institutional 
environments. Second, institutional improvement may temporarily adversely affect investment. However, 
this negative effect will gradually abate as new logics and beliefs are legitimised. Finally, proactive 
leadership may help ease the adverse influence of local sticky negative norms on investment incentives. 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1. Investment and institutions 
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The influence of institutional environments on entrepreneurial performance has been widely investigated 
in the extant literature. In general, institutions are human-made constraints or artificial rules, including 
formal institutions (laws and regulations), as well as informal institutions (norms and traditions) 
(Williamson, 2000). Institutions are the “rules of the game”, which establish a set of social expectations 
that determine which behaviours are more legitimated than others (Aidis et al., 2008). The link between 
institutions (requirements for legitimacy) and performance (efficiency), is cited to be negative if 
institutional arrangements enforce institutional liabilities, which require entrepreneurs to conduct 
legitimated activities at the costs of giving up efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In contrast, if 
institutional arrangements are constructed in a way that successfully aligns the requirements of legitimacy 
with efficiency, firms can boost performance by being exempted from the costs of decoupling or ceremonial 
operations (Baum and Oliver, 1991).1 
However, the influence of institutions on performance appears to be “institutionalised” a priori, i.e., taken-
for-granted. In the extant literature, entrepreneurial performance is hypothesised to be directly associated 
with institutional improvement, without sufficient discussions on the mechanisms (Du and Mickiewicz, 
2016). We suggest that performance is the ultimate result of a set of managerial/entrepreneurial strategies 
(Stenholm et al., 2013), which themselves (but not performance) are the very function of institutional 
environments. Given this viewpoint, we propose one potential strategic response which may serve as a 
mechanism to link institutions and performance. Specifically, we focus on investigating investment 
decisions. Investment is a process of realising business opportunities, whose availability and feasibility are 
highly associated with external environments, including the institutional settings (Zhou, 2017). 
Both formal and informal institutions can strongly shape investment incentives. However, the enforcement 
of formal institutions (central laws) largely depends on the effectiveness of local informal institutions 
(norms of doing business) (Nguyen et al., 2018). Moreover, a set of well organised “rules of the game”, 
need not become effective, as there is another force coming from the “play of the game”. The “play of the 
game”, according to Williamson (2000), is the implementations and executions of national institutions, 
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which are, once again, highly dependent on local traditions and practices. When the “play” mismatches 
with the “rules”, entrepreneurs face institutional complexity, which requires them to conform to a different 
(sometimes contradictory) set of logics (Raynard and Greenwood, 2002). Consequently, transaction costs 
and uncertainty inevitably increase, leading to a lower level of investment incentive. 
Even though sharing a common set of formal institutions, local partakers (including entrepreneurs and 
governors) may play the institutional game differently across regions to fit into the expectations of local 
norms, probably to seek legitimacy for their survival. These variations of commitment to local norms may 
be associated with the variations of entrepreneurial investment (and potential growth performance) across 
regions within a country. The following discussions investigate this possibility. 
2.2. Investment and Transparency 
Transparency in public services implies the uneven distribution of policy information among dissimilar 
economic players (Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). Transparency is a normative institutional force, indicating 
the “play” of local authorities in disseminating and communicating changes in legal documents, new 
policies and laws to local private sector (Malesky, 2015). These informational updates are important inputs 
to investment decisions because they determine the direction of planning and organising business strategies. 
Time lags in receiving proper information may lead to significant losses of business opportunities. Du and 
Mickiewicz (2016) find that the disproportionate communication of subsidy policy to small businesses, 
which are not dissimilar, will harm the entire economic performance. 
The extents to which legal information is disseminated are institutionalised by local norms of doing business 
(Malesky et al., 2015). These norms include social acceptance of a pecking order of receiving information 
based on “back-door” relationships. This institutional structure gives rise to an uneven playing field in 
which market principles are deteriorated, leading to inappropriate allocation of economic resources. 
Specifically, unequal communication of new-industry policies offers a small group of entrepreneurs 
valuable business opportunities to make an investment before others do (Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). 
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However, these first comers are not necessarily efficient investors to yield the most from the investment 
opportunities underhandedly offered to them (Zhou, 2013). 
Upon these adverse effects of opaqueness, firm investments may be positively associated with degrees of 
transparency in public services for three reasons. First, transparency opens access to proper planning and 
legal documents, reduces informational asymmetries between government policies and the business sector 
(Malesky, 2015). This helps improve institutional trust (trust in government) and mitigates perceived 
uncertainty in doing business since effective communication gives a sense that public policies will be 
predictably implemented. Second, transparency is the premise of property right protection, which is 
essential to investment decisions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Opaque legal documents, incomplete 
communication, and unpredictable changes in policy, significantly increase the perceived risk of 
appropriation, and lower entrepreneurs’ incentive of making investments (Caetano and Caleiro, 2009). 
Third, transparency reduces legitimacy liabilities. To obtain proper planning and legal documents necessary 
to run businesses, entrepreneurs must follow local norms, which may be either to offer bribes, or to establish 
“back-door” relationships with local officials by entertaining and gift giving (Du et al., 2015). These 
legitimate rent-seeking activities are a burden to entrepreneurs. As such, when local institutional 
environments become more transparent, entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive of investing. Hence, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: In a region, an improvement in public service transparency is associated with more firm investment. 
 
2.3. Investment and Corruption 
Corruption is one of the most salient consequences of the misalignment between the general formal legal 
frameworks and local legitimated norms and traditions (Tonoyan et al., 2010). Charron et al. (2014) observe 
an interesting fact which illustrates this very mismatch. Specifically, they find that many, if not most, highly 
8 
 
corrupt countries have stringent formal laws against corruption. In a simple definition, corruption is the 
misuse or abuse of powers for private gains at the expense of social damages (Jain, 2001). This is the case 
particular to emerging post-communist economies, where the formal institutional frameworks remain weak 
and underdeveloped (Nguyen et al., 2013; Dana and Galperin, 2008). As such, local authorities have more 
room to interpret and manipulate the “rules” towards their private gains, rather than on behalf of social 
benefits. The misalignment between the “rules” and the “play” becomes even worse when there are 
insufficient monitoring schemes to control local authorities’ behaviour (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Corruption is well recognised, at both micro and macro levels, as one of the most important hindrances to 
economic growth (Mo, 2001) because of the following reasons. First, corruption gives entrepreneurs an 
incentive to get involved in rent-seeking activities, such as building “back-door” relationships with 
politicians and administrators, using bribes or giving gifts and entertaining them (Du et al., 2015). These 
activities distract entrepreneurs from productive management tasks, leading to an inevitable reduction of 
productivity in the entire economy. 
Second, corruption imposes a heavy financial burden on operation costs. Bribes, which are informal costs 
however, find their way to be formally recorded as operation expenses, which eventually will increase 
product prices and reduce competitive advantages (Nguyen and Dijk, 2012). Third, corruption remarkably 
slows down the flow of transactions in the entire economy. The braking effect of corruption, is, in the sense 
that it may delay firms from getting licences or permits necessary for doing business (until they bribe) 
(Nguyen and Dijk, 2012), or restrict firms from gaining sufficient funding from (state-owned) financial 
intermediaries (Sarath and Pham, 2015). For these reasons, an improvement in corruption controls (less 
corrupt harassment) is associated with better economic performance (Mo, 2001). 
However, when zooming into the behaviour of corrupt officials via the lens of institutional theory, we notice 
that officials, especially those who benefit from the institutionalised norms of corruption, are strongly 
against any deviations, and tend to revert to the “old rules”. Fritsch and Wyrwich (2014) suggest that local 
informal institutions are rather sticky, persistent and deeply embedded in the way local business operates, 
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even when formal institutional frameworks completely change. When corruption controls are introduced as 
new “rules of the game”, officials confront multiple and conflicting logics that prescribe different courses 
of action. This situation gives rise to institutional complexity – a situation in which officials seek to adjust 
behaviour to balance more than one set of expectations. 
Specifically, as corruption controls improve, officials’ incentive to ask for bribes will reduce, as they 
evaluate the costs of being caught are now higher than the financial benefits gained from bribery 
transactions. However, it is noteworthy that keeping company with a reduction in corruption is a possibility 
that officials’ incentive towards providing qualified public services will accordingly drop (Gjalt et al., 2012). 
With lower compensation, officials will naturally adjust their inputs and work efficiency to match their new, 
lower level of incomes. This decision is a result of a cognitive changing to adopt to the new rewarding 
structure (Mitchell et al., 2002). The consequence of this behavioural adjustment is the stagnant, unqualified 
public services, and deteriorated business environment, leading to lower level of investment incentive. 
However, in the long-run, public service quality will revert to the normal level for two reasons. First, when 
corruption controls are fully implemented, a new set of social expectations on public services is 
institutionalised, officials gradually take the higher standard of services for granted. Also, they have an 
incentive to seek legitimacy in their profession by not breaking the (newly) established norms (Estrin et al., 
2013). Second, when corruption controls are raised to a higher level and rigid monitors on service quality 
are introduced, the costs of maintaining low service quality (i.e., being punished) are higher than the costs 
of adapting to the new institutional environment. The main switching cost is the cognitive acceptance of 
the dissatisfaction related to the perceived unfairness of lower incomes (no bribes) that accompany a higher 
standard of services (Gjalt et al., 2012). However, to seek legitimacy (long-term survival), officials have an 
incentive to proactively follow the new “rules” by improving service quality as per the new set of social 
expectations and gradually abandon the old logic of unfairness. Consequently, the recovery of public 





H1b: In a region, an improvement in corruption controls is associated with firm investment in a U-shaped 
manner. 
 
It is noteworthy that we propose a U-shaped function of investment on the improvement in corruption 
controls but not in transparency. The reason is that norms associated with corruption are more persistent 
than those associated with administrative opaqueness. While keeping information obscure may simply be 
due to the needs of legitimacy (non-financial motivation), corruption is directly related to financial incomes 
of corrupt officials (Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). Because it is comfortable to stay in the old regime, corrupt 
officers are likely to act against institutional changes which deteriorate their benefits, and have a strong 
incentive to bond with the old norms. One potential solution to maintain the old logics and beliefs of “fair” 
transactions is to reduce work efficiency to cope with the increasingly stringent controls. This characteristic 
makes the process of institutionalising alternative norms to corruption more difficult, and requires higher 
costs than the process of institutionalising alternative norms to administrative opaqueness. 
2.4. Investment and Leadership Proactivity 
Leadership proactivity indicates the cleverness and friendliness of local governments in assisting local 
entrepreneurs doing business (Malesky, 2015). Unlike corruption and transparency, this force is an 
institution-embedded governance force. It measures the governance quality of local governments in 
facilitating local entrepreneurial investment, by cleverly interpreting and executing central laws in favour 
of the private sector. This governance force is distinct by its characteristics of being largely controlled by 
local authorities, flexible to adjustments, and less sticky to local norms (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
These characteristics of leadership proactivity come from a typical political arrangement in which local 
authorities are assigned by the central government, and by convention, take the positions in a specific tenure 
of office before being reassigned (i.e., switched to other regions or promoted to the central government) 
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(Zhou, 2017). As such, even though local authorities must ally to local norms for the sake of their own 
legitimacy, the level of leadership proactivity is highly dependent on their leadership styles and ideologies 
(Tung, 2014). 
Proactive leadership may boost local investment for three reasons. First, proactive leaders are keen to 
flexibly implement central policy, or to creatively design their own initiatives for local private sector 
development (Nguyen and Dijk, 2012). They may also work within unclear national regulatory frameworks 
to assist and interpret in favour of local private sector. This conducive governance force thus provides a 
strong incentive for local entrepreneurs to make investments. It may also reduce the general level of 
transaction costs, as regulations under a proactive leadership regime are well aligned with entrepreneurs’ 
productive activities (Baron, 2007). Moreover, leadership proactivity magnifies the likelihood that 
investment projects positioned at the margin of the existing regulations (e.g., investment in a completely 
new industry) are authorised and supported. In a rigid regulatory environment, authorities will not provide 
accommodating considerations on unconventional projects’ legal feasibility, which may lead to approvals, 
but a governance system led by proactive authorities, may offer them a chance (Audretsch et al., 2015). 
Second, proactive leadership may improve the general level of institutional trust (trust in government). This 
is achieved when local authorities consistently maintain their proactivity sufficiently long enough to trigger 
a change in entrepreneurs’ perceptions of government quality (Nguyen et al., 2018). Consequently, local 
entrepreneurs will gradually reduce their perceived uncertainty in government policy and potential risks of 
appropriation. This cognitive adjustment is particularly important to increase the sense of property rights 
protection, which is an essential antecedent of investment decisions. 
Third, proactive leadership may reduce the burden of conforming to adverse norms (e.g. bribery) and rent-
seeking activities, leaving entrepreneurs with more resources to make investments (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Proactive authorities offer “short-cuts” for entrepreneurs to obtain information, permits and subsidies 
necessary to run businesses without a need to legitimise themselves to local negative norms. As such, 
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entrepreneurs can mobilise more resources towards productive activities, and are able to make more 
investments. Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1c: In a region, an improvement in leadership proactivity is associated with more firm investment. 
 
2.5. Leadership Proactivity as a moderator  
Besides the direct effect on investment, leadership proactivity may moderate the relationship between 
investment and transparency/corruption, which are rather sticky (compared to proactivity) in the way local 
business operates. Specifically, proactive leadership is likely to deviate from the existing practices. As such, 
proactive authorities may be referred to as institutional governors whose governance ideologies may 
sometimes mismatch with local traditions and norms. Mismatches give rise to institutional complexity, 
leading to combining elements from multiple logics, and subsequently trigger broader institutional changes 
(Raynard and Greenwood, 2002). Proactive leadership is able to affect local (negative) norms for two 
reasons. First, authorities are the central players of the governance system; therefore, they are less 
constrained by local institutions (Baum and Oliver, 1991). In addition, they may not be indigene, thus being 
less contaminated by local (negative) norms. 
The sources of proactivity may vary by leaders and by circumstances, but could be classified into three 
broad categories. First, the motivation of being proactive may be institutionalised, i.e., local authorities 
become more proactive, because this practice is adopted in other regions. In this case, authorities try to seek 
legitimacy (among governors) by steering their governance-style closer to the general trend. This mimetic 
mechanism occurs primarily in circumstances of ambiguity and uncertainty (e.g., unclear central policy) 
(Raynard and Greenwood, 2002). Under such conditions, governors copy others perceived to be more 
successful and more legitimate. Second, proactivity may be introduced by surrounding environments. 
Specifically, tenure rotatory, job movements, and emerging leadership ideologies offer authorities 
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reflection opportunities, which may lead to adjustments in governance styles (Mitchell et al., 2002). Finally, 
proactivity may stem from normative pressure promulgated by emerging professions and their institutional 
norms and practices. For example, the growing foreign direct investment in emerging countries is 
accompanied with spill-overs of advanced business standards and arm-length principles. These new players 
may actively require governors to improve local business environments before they make substantial 
investments (Nguyen and Dijk, 2012). 
More importantly, proactivity may be particularly prominent in regions where corruption practices and 
administration opaqueness are tightly institutionalised in local business norms. When negative norms are 
deeply embedded, a force (proactivity) that deviates from the norms attract substantial attention, because it 
offers entrepreneurs an opportunity to improve efficiency and to get rid of legitimacy liabilities, leading to 
a stronger incentive for investment (Raynard and Greenwood, 2002). Meanwhile, when entrepreneurs have 
experienced a considerable institutional improvement, a force (proactivity) that deviates from the negative 
norms has a modest influence because its marginal effect is less impressive to (effective on) local 
entrepreneurs (Nguyen et al., 2018). They are acquainted with a more conducive institutional environment 
including a higher degree of transparency and lower level of corruption. Consequently, leadership 
proactivity is less significant in regions with favourable institutional environments, but it has greater impact 
in regions where institutional environments remain hostile. Therefore, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The effect of proactivity on firm investment is stronger in regions with lower transparency and higher 
corruption. 
 
3. Vietnam as a context 
The empirical setting of this study is Vietnam. The country is an interesting context to investigate the impact 
of local institutions on investment, due to its post-communist political ideology and on-going economic 
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transformation. The socialist-oriented market economy aims to develop a multi-sectoral market economy, 
in which the state sector plays a decisive role in directing economic development, with the eventual long-
term goal of achieving socialism (Makino and Tsang, 2011). 
This ideology has been applied since 1965. Since then, Vietnam’s economic development can be 
categorised into four periods: 1965-75 – war in the South, and the socialist industrialisation in the North; 
1976-85 – socialist industrialisation in the centrally planned economy; 1986-2005 – Doimoi (economic 
renovation) and the transition towards market-oriented and open economy; 2006-present – trade 
liberalisation in post WTO entry and economic restructuring. In the first two periods, the economy 
concentrated on heavy industry, and was exclusively led by the state under the planning structure in the 
absence of the market-based price mechanism. On the promulgation of the Company Law, private business 
was formally legalised from 1991. However, only until the 1999 revision of the Law to reduce entry barriers, 
did the private sector start to gain legitimacy in the economic system (Santarelli and Tran, 2012). 
Even though sharing a relatively homogenous and stable national institutional setting, local institutions 
across regions vary significantly for two reasons. The first is related to the history: while the economic 
system in North Vietnam was initially following the pure socialist blueprint, South Vietnam was 
transformed from capitalism since only 1975. This historical event gave rise to significant cultural and 
traditional differences among regions (Makino and Tsang, 2011; Dana, 1994). More importantly, these 
informal institutions are expected to stickily maintain, despite the two states being unified four decades ago. 
Second, institutional variations also resulted from the extensive decentralisation during the Doimoi  (Lan 
Phi and Anwar, 2011). The foundation of this program was the promulgation of the 1996 (revision in 1998) 
State Budget Law, which granted local governments considerable autonomy in their fiscal strategy. 
Subsequently, local authorities were granted with substantial independence in determining their local 
governance structures and regulatory arrangements (Santarelli and Tran, 2012). 
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These variations of informal institutions and institutions of governance give rise to dissimilarities in 
business environments across regions. Given that the private sector in Vietnam is quite young (legitimised 
only since 2000s), most businesses are small and operate within the boundary of their local markets, which 
are strongly shaped by local institutional settings (Dana and Edward, 2009). This makes Vietnam a relevant 
and an interesting context to examine local institutions on investment. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data 
We test the proposed hypotheses using a combination of two datasets. The first is the Annual Survey on 
Enterprises of Vietnam conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO). It is a sixteen-year panel from 
2000 to 2015 including firm-level information on investment, performance, financial and ownership 
structures of manufacturing and service sectors. However, this study is limited to ten years, from 2006 to 
2015, to match with the availability of the second dataset, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI)2, 
which was first conducted for a sample of regions in 2005, and then for all 63 provinces from 2006. The 
dataset is a product of the collaboration between Vietnam Chamber of Commerce (VCCI) and the U.S 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Specifically, PCI is an overall provincial competitiveness 
index constructed from analysing local institutional environments (e.g., corruption, transparency) and 
governance quality (e.g., leadership proactivity). Definition and summary statistics of the indices are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
4.2 Variables and summary statistics 
To clean the data, all firms with negative total assets, negative fixed assets, depreciation and employees are 
dropped, same as for firms whose fixed assets are greater than total assets. The outliers are controlled by 
censoring the top and bottom 1% of observations in each variable. We then select only domestic private 
companies as the population of interest. The final sample in regressions constitutes 945,724 observations 
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in 10 years. Details about the panel structure of the dataset, including firm observations by year and by 
frequency, are reported in Appendix 2. 
The dependent variable is firm investment, measured by the ratio of total investment to total capital.3 Unlike 
previous studies, utilising balance sheet items to calculate changes in fixed assets as a proxy for investment, 
in this study, we use firm self-reported investment information. As such, our investment variable is broader 
by definition and captures more information on firm investment activities. Specifically, four investment 
terms are covered in our investment variable, including: (1) construction of factory and building, (2) 
machinery and other fixed asset purchase, (3) technology upgrade and updated spending, and (4) net 
working capital investment. The first three items are the conventional fixed-asset investment. Meanwhile, 
the last item is suggested by Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Ding et al. (2013) and Baños-Caballero et al. 
(2014), who argue that working capital is an important financing source of investment, especially in the 
context of financing constraints. This is particularly the case in emerging countries, where small businesses 
typically do not obtain sufficient bank loans (Carreira and Silva, 2010), and working capital may serve as 
an alternative financing source to fixed investment. 
Our independent variables include corruption, transparency, and leadership proactivity. Corruption variable 
takes the score value of the corruption index in the PCI dataset. The index takes values from 1 to 10, the 
higher the score, the better the corruption controls (lower freedom from corruption). This index is a measure 
of how much firms pay for bribery, how much of an obstacle those extra financial burdens pose on their 
business operations, whether payment of those extra fees results in expected results or "services," and 
whether local officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents. 
Transparency variable takes the score value of the transparency index in the PCI dataset. The index takes 
values from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the more transparency in public services. This index measures 
whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their business, 
whether those documents are equitably available, whether new policies, subsidies, and regulations are 
communicated with local business community and predictably implemented. 
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To measure the proactivity of local top authorities towards their local private sector, we use the proactivity 
variable, which takes the score value of the leadership proactivity index in the PCI dataset. The index takes 
values from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the more proactivity. It is a measure of the creativity and cleverness 
of local authorities in implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector 
development, and sometimes working within unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret 
in favour of local private firms.4 
We also include a set of covariates following the suggestions of previous works. At firm level, we include 
firm age, firm labour size, asset structure, revenue, and cash flow variables. These firm-specific 
characteristics are highly associated with investment decisions as they represent investment capacity and 
available opportunities (Ding et al., 2013; Tran and Santarelli, 2014). At entrepreneur individual-level, we 
include owner age, a proxy for entrepreneurs’ education and experience, which may influence investment 
decision (Santarelli and Tran, 2013). At provincial level, we control local market demands using population 
density and the average consumption power variables (Nguyen et al., 2018). We also use the ratio of labour 
force over total population as a proxy for human resource supply, which is an essential input of investment 
(Dang, 2013). Finally, we include distance from a province to the closest municipality (business and 
political centre) as a proxy for geographical interaction (Driffield et al., 2013). 
Details of variable definition and summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The statistics show that 
Vietnam is a typical entrepreneurial economy, in which the majority of domestic business population is 
young and small companies (Du and Mickiewicz, 2016). Specifically, the average age is six-years old and 
the average labour size is 31 employees, with investment value approximates 38% of total capital per year. 
In terms of local institutions, statistics show that there are substantial variations across time and space. 
Leadership proactivity has the largest range in which the score varies from 1.39 to 9.39. It is also the only 
index whose mean performance is lower than 5, showing that the degree of proactivity of local leaders, on 
average, has not met the middling criteria set by PCI. The correlation matrix among variables is reported 




Table 1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
4.3 Specification and estimation 
Following the extant literature (Nguyen et al., 2018; Zhou, 2013), we propose the following reduced-form 
investment function. This is our benchmark specification: 
(𝟏) 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔𝑡) 
+𝑣𝑗 +  𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑖 denotes individual firm, 𝑔 is province, and 𝑡 is year. As such, (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑡) is the investment 
rate that firm 𝑖 in province 𝑔 makes in year 𝑡. The term (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡) is a column vector of variables 
including firm age, firm labour size, revenue, asset structure, and cash flow; the term (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡) is 
entrepreneur individual age variable; (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑡) constitutes province average consumption, 
population density, labour force, and distance to the closet business centre. The three variables: 
(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑔𝑡), (𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔𝑡)  represents the three dimensions of local 
institutions: corruption, transparency, and leadership proactivity respectively. The investment function also 
includes an industry-specific component 𝑣𝑗, and a time-specific component 𝑣𝑡, which are controlled by 
corresponding dummies. The term 𝑣𝑖  represents all time-invariant, firm-level fixed effects that may 
influence the investment rate. Finally, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error. 
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We are interested in the coefficients of 𝛽4 , 𝛽5  and 𝛽6  as they indicate the association between local 
institutions and investment. To further analyse the U-shaped pattern of corruption, we propose the following 
modified specification: 
(𝟐) 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑔𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽6(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑔𝑡)
+ 𝛽7(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔𝑡) + 𝑣𝑗 +  𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
For equation (2), we are interested in the coefficients 𝛽4 and 𝛽5. It is expected that 𝛽4 is negative and 𝛽5 – 
the squared term of corruption is positive to establish a U-shaped function of investment on corruption. To 
test the moderation effect of leadership proactivity on corruption and transparency, we further include two 
interaction terms: (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔𝑡 ×  𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡)  and (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑔𝑡 ×  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑔𝑡)  into 
equation (2). According to hypothesis H2, it is expected that the coefficients associated with the interaction 
terms are negative, indicating that for provinces facing low values of corruption index (more corruption) 
and low values of transparency index (less transparency), the effect of proactivity on investment in these 
provinces becomes stronger. 
All equations are estimated using a fixed effect (FE) panel estimator, corrected by applying robust standard 
errors clustered by individual firm and by province. To control for potential endogeneity, all independent 
variables that may suffer from reverse effects are lagged one year. They include firm size, asset structure, 
revenue, and cash flow. Moreover, Tran and Santarelli (2014) argue that private sector development 
(investment) may exert pressure on local authorities to improve local institutions and governance quality, 
which may be a source of endogeneity (reverse effect). As such, we also lag corruption, transparency, and 
proactivity variables by one year. The fixed effect estimator in addition could deal, to some extent, with 
unobservable heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of missing (time-invariant firm-specific) variables 
in the model. It is worth noting that firm-level attributes, industrial sector and regional characteristics that 
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are time-invariant, are already controlled by the fixed effects. Hausman tests are conducted to check the 
endogeneity of the fixed effect, as well as to confirm its appropriateness over the random effect. We also 
conducted a VIF test for multicollinearity on the benchmark specification.5 
5. Empirical results 
Regression results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 are the direct effects of corruption, transparency, 
and proactivity. Columns 3-7 show the moderation effects of proactivity on corruption and transparency. 
In general, the Hausman tests in all specifications verify the validity of the fixed effect over the random 
effect method. Moreover, the VIF test of the benchmark specification is 2.86, indicating that there are no 
serious issues related to multicollinearity in the modelling. 
 
Table 2: Local Institutions on Investment 
 
While the coefficients associated with transparency and proactivity are positive and statistically significant, 
the coefficients associated with corruption are negative in all specifications. Because corruption is directly 
linked to the financial incomes of officials, when corruption controls improve, their incomes are negatively 
affected. This change will naturally trigger a drop in work attitude and reduce efficiency, which inevitably 
deteriorates public service quality, and ultimately leads to lower investment. 
However, as corruption controls achieve further improvements, the negative effect reverses as shown by 
the positive coefficients associated with the squared term. The U-shaped pattern of corruption indicates the 
process of cognitive adjustments. When corruption controls become a legitimised (widely accepted) norm 
in a local institutional environment, officials start providing better services. As such, hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
and H1c are fully supported. 
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Using the coefficients of corruption and its squared term to calculate the turning point6 shows that the 
positive effect starts from 7.68 scores. The average score of corruption is 5.91 in the study period, implying 
that corruption controls in Vietnam are still in the initial phase, stronger controls are in need to attract more 
private investment. In terms of the economic effect, each point of corruption control improvement is 
associated with a 3.1% decrease in investment rate (column 1). For transparency and proactivity variables, 
their effects are economically weaker than the influence of corruption. Specifically, a marginal score of 
transparency index is associated with an investment rate of 1.23%; and 0.3% for a marginal score of 
proactivity, lower than the 3% negative effect of corruption. This result might explain the fact that when 
governments began tweaking local institutional environments, in the initial phase, the net effect of 
institutional improvements on local entrepreneurship was not as expected. 
Regarding the moderation effects, the coefficients associated with the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant. This finding indicates that leadership proactivity is more effective in provinces 
suffering from severe corruption and opaqueness in public services. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is fully 
supported. The marginal effects of proactivity on transparency and corruption are presented in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. The slope of the curves of lower corruption controls and less transparency (-1 standard deviation 
from the means) is steeper in comparison to those of better corruption controls and more transparency (+1 
standard deviation from the means), indicating that the association between leadership proactivity and 
investment is stronger when local institutions are more unfavourable. Given that leadership proactivity is 
relatively controllable, this finding suggests that, regardless the prevailing unfavourable norms, local 
governments are able to facilitate local entrepreneurship by improving their governance quality (i.e., being 
more proactive). 
 
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Transparency 




This study investigates the “play” of local institutions on private firm investment. We propose that 
corruption, transparency and leadership proactivity are important determinants of investment decision. We 
analyse several characteristics of, and interactions among local institutional forces to understand the nature 
of their effects on investment. Our study is an attempt to fulfil a gap in literature pointed out by Du and 
Mickiewicz (2016) that while the relationship between national general institutional settings and 
entrepreneurship is well understood, the role of local institutions is largely unexplored. We make 
contributions by showing that institutional variations at local level – the plays of the institutional game take 
an essential role in determining investment incentive. As such, the conventional assumption of the 
homogenous effect of the general institutional configurations at national level may not always hold its 
validity. 
We also make contributions by investigating the persistence of local norms and its consequence on 
investment. Some norms are more sticky and resistant to changes, because they are closely related to the 
financial benefits of institutional players (Gjalt et al., 2012). Corruption is an example. This institutional 
force is distinct from other non-financial forces, as it is directly linked to the financial incomes of local 
politicians and administrators who participate in the bribery game. In line with Gjalt et al. (2012), we 
suggest that when corruption controls improve, local private firms do not necessarily find this advancement 
favourable. The role of cognitive adjustments of local officials whose incomes are affected by corruption 
controls is essential, but largely neglected in the extant literature (Baron, 2007). Only when corruption 
controls are sufficiently strong to gain full legitimacy and to establish a new socially accepted standard of 
doing business, corrupt officials will begin to improve service quality; otherwise, they will keep reducing 
efficiency to match the old logics of equality. 
While Nguyen et al. (2018) find that leadership proactivity is essential to private firm performance, we 
show that this institution-embedded governance force also has a crucial effect in moderating local 
corruption and administration opaqueness. Regions facing severe corruption and opaque public services 
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can rely on proactive leadership to alleviate the negative effects of local (unfavourable) norms and nurture 
institutional trust. While corruption and transparency take a long time to improve as they are deeply 
embedded in local traditions and social legitimacy (Williamson, 2000), leadership proactivity arrangements, 
which are adjustable in the short-term, may serve as a functional governance tool (Nguyen et al., 2018). As 
such, this study suggests a specific and plausible approach for local authorities to boost entrepreneurial 
investment even when local institutions remain unfavourable. 
Besides academic contributions, this study also provides several insights for policymakers. First, it is 
important to distinguish financial institutional forces from non-financial ones. For the non-financial 
institutional forces such as transparency and proactivity, their effects on local entrepreneurial activities are 
relatively straightforward. However, when it comes to institutional changes concerned with officials’ 
incomes (e.g., corruption controls), adverse effects may occur due to confrontation. Specifically, 
policymakers should consider  the possibility that local officials will shirk when they are not allowed to 
receive bribes. 
This study also suggests that leadership proactivity plays a prominent role in impairing the adverse impact 
of local unfavourable institutions (corruption and opaqueness). Proactive leadership is, fortunately, a 
controllable variable in the hands of local authorities. The key point here is to maintain a consistent and 
sustainable proactive environment to gradually erase local perceptions concerning the necessity of 
corruption and opaqueness in doing business. Nguyen et al. (2018) argue that trust in government, to some 
extent, is able to moderate local negative norms, and plays as a critical engine to boost entrepreneurial 
activities and performance. 
7. Conclusion 
Variations in local institutions and government quality are essential determinants of entrepreneurial 
activities and performance (Nguyen et al., 2018). In this study, we show that the play of local institutional 
game including corruption, administration transparency, and leadership proactivity is important to 
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investment decisions. Corruption controls may initially reduce investment incentives because corrupt 
officials without bribes may attempt to shirk their duties, leading to deteriorated local business 
environments. However, this negative effect will abate as soon as the new standards of public services are 
legitimised. Meanwhile, the non-financial force such as transparency, which is relatively less sticky in 
comparison to corruption, does not suffer from the initial inertia. In addition, leadership proactivity – an 
institution-embedded governance force, which is arguably under control of local authorities, can moderate 
the adverse impact of corruption and opaqueness in public administration. 
In general, this study suggests that local institutions are multi-dimensional, and that each institutional force 
has a specific degree of persistence. This characteristic of institutions is particularly important because it 
determines the severity of the initial (negative) inertia when institutions improve. The more embedded the 




Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Investment The ratio of additional capital invested to total 
capital 
0.38 0.55 0.00 3.55 
Corruption Value of the corruption index. The indicator 
ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, the 
better the corruption controls. 
5.91 1.05 4.13 8.94 
Transparency Value of the transparency index. The indicator 
ranges from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the 
more transparent the public services. 
5.73 1.36 2.14 8.85 
Proactivity Value of the leadership proactivity index. The 
indicator ranges from 1 to 10, the higher the 
score, the more proactive the local leadership. 
4.61 1.31 1.39 9.39 
Firm age Years of operation since the establishment 5.93 5.45 1 68 
Firm size Natural log of the number of employees 
(reported here the number of employees) 
31.54 297.16 1 87,225 
Asset structure The ratio of fixed assets to total assets 0.19 0.21 0 0.92 
Revenue The ratio of revenue earnings to total capital 1.27 2.25 0 14.59 
Cash flow The ratio of cash flow to total capital 0.02 0.14 -0.66 0.62 
Owner age Age of business owner, in year 42.70 9.96 24 69 
Distance Distance from a province to the closet 
economic centre, in km 
77.55 118.08 1 499 
Density The ratio of population over area by province 
per year, in person per km2 
1,832.68 1,364.89 39.77 3,888 
Consumption The value of provincial average consumption 
depreciated to 2010 value, in million VND per 
capita a year 
37.16 23.84 1.11 89.12 
Labour The ratio of labour force over total population 
by province per year 
0.55 0.04 0.45 0.79 
Note: The data sources are Vietnam Annual Enterprise Survey and Provincial Competitiveness Index. The number of 




Table 2: Local Institutions on Investment 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Corruption -0.0308*** -0.189*** -0.0316*** -0.182*** -0.00914** -0.175*** -0.183***  













Transparency 0.0123*** 0.0145*** 0.0437*** 0.0416*** 0.0126*** 0.0152*** 0.0158***  
(0.00176) (0.00176) (0.00467) (0.00466) (0.00175) (0.00176) (0.00177) 
Proactivity 0.00344*** 0.00406*** 0.0403*** 0.0360*** 0.0320*** 0.0422*** 0.0433***  
(0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00527) (0.00526) (0.00552) (0.00555) (0.00555) 








Proactivity × Corruption 
    
-0.00427*** -0.00568*** -0.00525***      
(0.000803) (0.000808) (0.000816) 
Proactivity × Corruption2       -9.66e-05*** 
       (2.21e-05) 
Firm age 0.00466 0.00238 0.00434 0.00221 0.00383 0.00107 0.000783  
(0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00408) (0.00408) 
Firm size -0.0430*** -0.0428*** -0.0430*** -0.0428*** -0.0430*** -0.0428*** -0.0428***  
(0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) 
Asset structure -0.0483*** -0.0483*** -0.0483*** -0.0483*** -0.0480*** -0.0479*** -0.0478***  
(0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00569) 
Revenue -0.00166*** -0.00169*** -0.00163*** -0.00166*** -0.00164*** -0.00167*** -0.00172***  
(0.000437) (0.000437) (0.000437) (0.000437) (0.000437) (0.000437) (0.000437) 
Cash flow 0.0975*** 0.0958*** 0.0972*** 0.0956*** 0.0974*** 0.0954*** 0.0959***  
(0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727) (0.00727) 
Owner age -0.00611 -0.00575 -0.00619 -0.00584 -0.00599 -0.00557 -0.00563  
(0.00399) (0.00399) (0.00399) (0.00399) (0.00399) (0.00399) (0.00399) 
Distance -0.000861*** -0.000726*** -0.000874*** -0.000744*** -0.000868*** -0.000724*** -0.000673**  
(0.000273) (0.000271) (0.000273) (0.000271) (0.000273) (0.000271) (0.000270) 
Density -3.40e-05*** -2.42e-05*** -3.65e-05*** -2.69e-05*** -3.64e-05*** -2.66e-05*** -2.41e-05***  
(5.78e-06) (5.89e-06) (5.78e-06) (5.90e-06) (5.80e-06) (5.90e-06) (5.94e-06) 
Consumption -0.00338*** -0.00319*** -0.00331*** -0.00314*** -0.00322*** -0.00296*** -0.00284***  
(0.000185) (0.000186) (0.000185) (0.000185) (0.000188) (0.000189) (0.000191) 
27 
 
Labour 0.289*** 0.286*** 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.310***  
(0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0494) (0.0493) (0.0492) 
Hausman p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 945,724 945,724 945,724 945,724 945,724 945,724 945,724 
 R squared 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment. The results reported were estimated using the fixed effect panel estimator controlling for multi-level structure of 
the data. All specifications include full sets of two-digit industry dummies and 10-year dummies. The variables: corruption, corruption squared, transparency, 
proactivity, firm size, asset structure, revenue, and cash flow are lagged one year. The figures reported in parentheses are robust standard errors. Hausman test 



































Appendix 1:  
Table: PCI Index Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
Note: The panel encompasses all of 63 provinces and municipal cities in Vietnam in the period 2006-2015, obtained 
from the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) dataset. 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Legal 
institutions 
Measure the confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether firms 
regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute 
resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official 
behaviour. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, the 
higher the score, the better the institutions. 
7.76 0.90 4.96 9.60 
Entry costs Measures the differences in entry costs for new firms across provinces 
(for example, length of business registration in days, etc.). The indicator 
is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the lower 
the entry costs. 
5.16 1.49 1.94 8.84 
Land access Combine two dimensions of the land problems confronting 
entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure 
once land is acquired. The variable is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 
10, the higher the score, the better the access. 
5.67 1.44 2.14 8.56 
Time costs Measures how much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance, as 
well as how often and for how long firms must shut their operations down 
for inspections by local regulatory agencies. The indicator is two-digit 
value, ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the better the access.  
5.96 0.81 2.64 8.93 
Business 
supports 
Measures provincial services for trade promotion, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, 
provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological 
services for firms. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, 
the higher the score, the better the support. 
5.84 1.06 4.13 8.94 
Labour training Measures the efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational 
training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the 
placement of local labours. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 
1 to 10, the higher the score, the better the training. 
4.82 1.02 2.00 7.91 
Corruption Measures how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an 
obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether 
payment of those extra fees results in expected results or "services," and 
whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to 
extract rents. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, the 
higher the score, the lower the charges (corruption). 
5.91 1.05 4.13 8.94 
Transparency Measures whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal 
documents necessary to run their business, whether those documents are 
equitably available, new policies and laws are communicated to firms 
and predictably implemented. The indicator is two-digit value, ranging 
from 1 to 10, the higher the score, the more transparent. 
5.73 1.36 2.14 8.85 
Leadership 
proactivity 
Measures the creativity and cleverness of provinces in implementing 
central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector 
development, and working within sometimes unclear national regulatory 
frameworks to assist and interpret in favour of local private firms. The 
indicator is two-digit value, ranging from 1 to 10, the higher the score, 
the more proactive.  
4.61 1.31 1.39 9.39 
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Appendix 2:  
Table: Details About the Panel Structure of Our Dataset 
 
Number of years per firm Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
1       86,665  9.2% 9.2% 
2     141,828  15.0% 24.2% 
3     149,523  15.8% 40.0% 
4     174,920  18.5% 58.5% 
5     123,490  13.1% 71.5% 
6     269,298  28.5% 100.0% 
Total     945,724  100%  
Year Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage 
2007 82,733 8.7% 8.7% 
2008 100,063 10.6% 19.3% 
2009 122,299 12.9% 32.3% 
2010 155,423 16.4% 48.7% 
2011 207,703 22.0% 70.7% 
2012 277,503 29.3% 100.0% 















Table: Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Investment (1)               
Corruption (2) 0.00 a 
            
 
Transparency (3) 0.05 0.39 
           
 
Proactivity (4) 0.02 0.46 0.25 
          
 
Firm age (5) -0.19 -0.02 -0.05 0.00a 
         
 
Firm size (6) -0.33 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.30 
        
 
Asset structure (7) 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.23 
       
 
Revenue (8) -0.02 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.00 
      
 
Cash flow (9) -0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.02 
     
 
Owner age (10) -0.13 0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.39 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.13 
    
 
Distance (11) -0.03 0.06 -0.34 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.15 
   
 
Density (12) -0.01 -0.34 0.02 -0.27 -0.07 -0.21 -0.30 -0.14 -0.09 -0.15 -0.67 
  
 
Consumption (13) -0.05 -0.42 -0.23 -0.35 -0.03 -0.27 -0.29 -0.16 0.00 -0.12 -0.52 0.81 
 
 
Labour (14) -0.03 0.35 -0.01 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.32 -0.59 -0.52  
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1 Decoupling is a strategy in which organisations adopt structures and practices that are aligned with institutional 
prescriptions, but which are deliberately distanced from how work is actually performed. Conformity is thus 
“ceremonial” rather than substantive. 
2 PCI is a rigorous survey of more than 10,000 domestic firms and 1,700 foreign invested enterprises about local 
institutional environment and governance quality across provinces in Vietnam. From 2013, there is an additional sub-
index Policy Bias. Details of items measured in each indicator, methodology, and data collection information please 
visit www.eng.pcivietnam.org. 
3 In this study investment variable is normalised by total capital. Using ratio instead of value is theoretically necessary 
and very common in the investment literature, and can be seen as a required normalisation (Du et al, 201). 
4 Details of the PCI methodology are available at: http://eng.pcivietnam.org/phuong-phap-c9.html 
5 Except for the benchmark, other modified specifications are based on the interaction terms. Therefore, VIF test is 
not appropriate to indicate the multicollinearity among variables (Wooldridge, 2002). 
6 The turning point is calculated using the absolute value of corruption coefficient (0.189) divided by two times the 
coefficient associated with the squared term of corruption (0.0123). 
                                                          
